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Abstract 
 
This paper offers an integrated analysis of out-sourcing, off-shoring and 
foreign direct investment within a systems view of international business. This view 
takes the supply chain rather than the firm as the basic unit of analysis. It argues that 
competition in the global economy selects supply chains that maximise the joint profit 
of all the firms in the chain. The systems view is compared with the firm-centred view 
commonly used in strategy literature. The paper shows that a firm’s strategy must be 
embedded within an efficient supply chain strategy, and that this strategy must be 
negotiated with, rather than imposed upon, other firms. The paper analyses the 
conditions under which various supply chain strategies - and by implication various 
firm-level strategies - are efficient. Only by adopting a systems view of supply chains 
is it possible to determine which firm-level strategies will succeed in a volatile global 
economy. 
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1. Introduction 
There are two main perspectives on international business (IB) strategy in the 
literature. The first view is firm-centred; it focuses on the competitive advantages of 
an individual firm, and the way that these advantages influence its strategy and 
structure. Building on Dunning’s eclectic theory (Dunning, 1977; Dunning and 
Lundan, 2008), and informed by strategy and resource-based theory (Porter, 1980; 
Barney and Clark, 2007), the firm-centred view addresses issues of strategic alliances, 
cross-cultural management, subsidiary autonomy, and so on (see e.g. Birkinshaw and 
Young, 2005; Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005). The second view is the systems view, 
which focuses on the firm’s environment as well as on the firm itself (Casson, 1990; 
Buckley and Hashai, 2004). The unit of analysis is the global production system. 
Building on internalisation theory (Buckley and Casson, 1998; Rugman, 1981; 
Hennart, 1982), the systems view examines how far linkages within the global system 
will be coordinated by multinational enterprises (MNEs) rather than markets. The 
systems view highlights the strategic importance of interactions between product flow 
and knowledge flow (Adler and Hashai, 2007). It identifies the characteristics of 
technologies, products and locations that stimulate the emergence of MNEs and 
encourage the flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) associated with them. 
The spread of global supply chains is an important development of the last 
twenty years (Buckley and Ghauri, 2011; Mudambi and Venzin, 2010). In early 
literature supply chains were often described as multi-stage production systems 
(following Carlson, 1939 and Lerner, 1953). The process of differentiation, by which 
production is subdivided into ever smaller separable units, was described in terms of 
advancing specialisation, whilst the dispersion of different activities was described as 
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an international division of labour (Frobel, Heinrchs and Kreye,1980). Early IB 
theorists recognised that there was a division of labour in the production of 
knowledge as well as in the production of ordinary goods (Buckley and Casson, 
1976). The integrated analysis of knowledge flow and production flow has since 
become known as “value chain analysis” (Porter, 1980), and the application of this 
approach to international multi-stage production as “global value chain” theory 
(Sturgeon, van Biesebroeck and Gereffi, 2008). 
From a systems perspective, international supply chains are the basic building 
blocks of the global production system; an individual supply chain for a particular 
product is a microcosm of the system as a whole (Antras and Helpman, 2004; Casson, 
1985). Within a supply chain, the strategies of individual firms are inter-dependent; 
firms compete when they plan to control the same part of the chain, and co-operate 
when they plan to control different parts of the chain. Thus one firm’s strategy may be 
dictated, at least in part, by another firm’s strategy. If neither firm is dominant then 
strategy may have to be negotiated rather than imposed. 
By contrast, the firm-centred view focuses on a single firm, usually identified 
as the “channel leader” or “orchestrator”. It suggests that this dominant firm will 
normally possess an advantage (e.g. a key patent or brand) and will appropriate most 
of the rent (i.e. supernormal profit) from the chain. It takes the strategies of rival firms 
as given, and regards other firms in the supply chain as essentially passive. Contrary 
to this, the systems view suggests that advantages are context-dependent. According 
to the systems view, the way that firms in a supply chain behave is determined by the 
economic fundamentals rather than by the strategy of a leading firm. These 
fundamentals include trade barriers, transport costs, transaction costs, and differential 
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location-specific production costs. These fundamentals apply to the industry as a 
whole and not just to one individual firm.  
The firm-centred view is useful for business school teaching and strategy 
consulting, because the theory is developed from the perspective of a manager of an 
individual firm. The systems view, however, is more appropriate for addressing long-
term global issues of concern to managers of all firms of whatever type. The systems 
view takes a more detached and distant view that embraces the entire global economy. 
It focuses, not on any individual firm, but on the entire population of firms – both 
existing firms and potential firms – that interact through competition and cooperation 
to coordinate the global economy. According to the systems view, existing types of 
firm can disappear, and new types of firm emerge, in response to radical changes in 
global conditions, such as lower trade barriers and transport costs, and reductions in 
transactions costs due to stronger property rights. The firm-centred view, by contrast, 
focuses on more incremental adjustments made by existing firms, and often ascribes 
these changes to innovations in business strategy instead.   
Section 2 explains the key features of the systems view by reference to 
Coase’s (1937) seminal work. Section 3 presents a systems view of international 
supply chain coordination. The formal model is set out in section 4 and solved in 
section 5. The implications of the solution are discussed in section 6. Out-sourcing 
and off-shoring are examined in section 7, and inward and outward FDI in section 8. 
Section 9 shows that analysing supply chain strategy from the standpoint of an 
individual firm can be misleading because the same strategy may appear quite 
different to firms that are headquartered in different countries. Practical applications 
are discussed in section 10 and the conclusions are summarised in section 11. 
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The analysis shows that optimal supply chain configuration is governed by 
four key trade-offs. Previous work has considered three of these trade-offs, but 
usually one at a time. This paper offers the first integrated rigorous account of the 
interplay between all four. The analysis also shows that firms of different types may 
co-exist at different stages of the same chain. The configuration of firms in a given 
chain will vary according to the economic fundamentals of the industry, including the 
technology embodied in the product, the institutional environment and the geography 
of the global economy. 
2. Principle of supply chain coordination 
The model has philosophical as well as practical significance, as it pushes forward a 
research agenda initiated by Ronald Coase. According to Coase (1937), firms emerge 
because of the costs of using the market. If there were no costs of using the market 
then there would be no firms. The existence of firms, on this view, cannot be merely 
assumed, but must be analysed as an institutional response to the costs of the market. 
Management is a response to transaction costs. As a result, the number, size and scope 
of firms are endogenous. 
The boundaries of firms within a given economy must be consistent with each 
other. The ownership and location of different firms must be maintained in an 
institutional equilibrium. When the boundaries of one firm change, the boundaries of 
other firms must adjust. While these interdependencies are recognised in the literature 
they have never been formally analysed at an industry level. This paper provides a 
step in this direction.  
In Coase’s view the business system comprises a complex set of inter-related 
activities. Individual activities are created by a division of labour, as noted above, and 
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final product is delivered to customers through supply chains that require 
coordination. Within each supply chain, different boundaries generate different 
configurations that involve different relationships between the firms within the chain. 
Different configurations may be championed by different firms. Competition will 
select the most efficient configuration; it will drive down product price, or bid up 
resource costs, to the point where only the efficient configuration can earn a normal 
profit. Efficiency will dictate how many firms operate within the supply chain, the 
scope of each firm’s operations, and the precise location of the market boundaries 
between firms. 
When transaction costs are high an entire supply chain may be coordinated by 
a single vertically integrated firm, whereas when they are low the supply chain may 
be coordinated entirely by arm’s length trade between independent firms at each stage 
of production. When transaction costs are greater at certain stages of the chain than 
others, the stages with high transaction costs will be internalised within vertically 
integrated firms, and arm’s trade will be confined to stages with low transaction costs.  
When different stages of production are located in different countries, 
international supply chains are created.  The more sophisticated the division of labour, 
the greater the degree of specialisation, greater the proliferation of activities, and the 
greater the number of locations at which they can be carried out. A multinational 
enterprise (MNE) is created when activities based in different countries are integrated 
within the same firm (Buckley and Casson, 1976). On this view, MNEs emerge to 
coordinate particular portions of supply chains, and they emerge at the same time as 
other firms which coordinate other parts of the same supply chain. These other firms 
may be single-country firms, or they may be MNEs as well. Firms controlling one 
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part of a supply chain will have to negotiate with firms controlling adjacent parts of 
the supply chain, since neither can operate successfully without the other.  
Coase’s analysis therefore poses a major challenge to scholars who propose to 
analyse either the global economy or an individual supply chain in terms of the 
strategies of individual firms. From a Coasian perspective it is the supply chain as a 
whole, rather than the individual firm, that is the appropriate unit of analysis. To 
implement Coase’s vision in a global context it is necessary to develop a model of 
efficient supply chain coordination which does not assume a given channel leader or 
orchestrator, but allows the channel leader or orchestrator to emerge as the firm that 
has championed the efficient configuration.  
3. Modelling supply chains: general observations 
Casson and Wadeson (2012) (CW hereafter) have formalised the Coasian vision 
within in a simple context: a supply chain comprising just R&D, production and a set 
of customers. Their analysis reveals that the set of strategies available for 
international supply chain coordination is wider than supposed. Conventional theory 
identifies three strategies: exporting, import-substituting FDI and licensing. Supply 
chain analysis identifies a fourth strategy – “off-shore licensing” - which involves a 
firm licensing to a foreign-owned production plant located in its home country. CW 
argue that this strategy appears perverse only because strategic decisions are typically 
analysed from a licensor’s point of view. When the same situation is analysed from a 
licensee’s point of view, licensing can be interpreted as an asset-seeking strategy. 
More generally, CW argue that the complexities of the IB system cannot be 
understood purely from the standpoint of a potential foreign investor possessing a 
knowledge advantage over other firms. In the modern global economy supply chains 
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emerge from negotiations between firms. A firm that owns technology cannot 
invariably dictate the terms of the contracts used to coordinate a supply chain. Where 
rival technologies compete, for example, a firm with privileged access to the market 
may be able to dictate terms instead. 
A major weakness of the CW model is its simplistic supply chain. This paper 
generalises their model so that their results appear as a special case. Two key 
assumptions are relaxed. 
 Instead of supplying product direct to consumers, production now serves a 
distribution facility located in country 2. Thus the wholesale market linking 
production and distribution is distinguished from the retail market linking 
distribution and consumers. Distribution can be either domestically owned or 
foreign owned. 
 Foreign ownership of R&D is permitted, although the location of R&D 
remains fixed. 
The model identifies the most efficient way of serving a given market. In the 
absence of externalities, the efficient strategy maximises the total profit earned by 
firms within the supply chain. This allows each firm to maximise its own profit 
conditional on the profit accruing to the other firm. If the chosen strategy did not do 
this it would pay the firms to agree to replace it with one that did. It is shown that the 
efficient strategy depends on nine key parameters. Changes in the global environment 
change the values of these parameters and therefore change the supply chain strategies 
employed by firms. Parameter values may vary between industries, thereby generating 
industry-specific forms of supply chain coordination. Parameter values may also 
change over time, guiding the evolution of the international economy by changing the 
supply chain strategies used in individual industries. 
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4. The model 
There are three activities - production, distribution, and R&D – and each is carried out 
in a separate facility: a plant, warehouse and laboratory respectively. The consumers 
are at the end of the chain, and all are located in country 2. The model is illustrated 
schematically in Figure 1. R&D, represented by the triangle R, feeds knowledge 
(represented by a grey line) into production, represented by the square P. Product, 
(represented by a black line) is then consigned to distribution, represented by the 
square D, from whence it is despatched to consumers, represented by the square C. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
There are just two countries: country 1 in which R is based and country 2 in 
which C and D are based. Production P may be located in either country. There is one 
firm in each country. Notation follows CW’s conventions; thus to simplify the algebra 
it is assumed that firm 1 is headquartered in country 1 and firm 2 in country 2. 
Country 2 is often described as the “host” country, because it is the country in which 
the market is based. It is important to note, however, that when taking a systems view, 
country 2 is not necessarily the country in which FDI takes place. Activities cannot be 
subcontracted to other domestic firms. Potentially the two firms compete with each 
other to control the supply chain, but they can also collaborate with each other, e.g. 
one firm can license technology from the other, or act as its sales and distribution 
agent. 
 
It is assumed that the size of the market is fixed. The price is also fixed, either 
by competitive conditions, government regulation, or consumers’ refusal to pay more 
than some maximum acceptable price. Since both price and market size are fixed, 
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total revenue is fixed as well. Thus the maximisation of profit implies the 
minimisation of cost. It is assumed that revenue is sufficiently large that costs are 
always covered, and so production always takes place. Some of the costs are incurred 
by the facilities in which the activities are carried out, and some by the linkages 
between these facilities. Each facility involves a stock of assets - physical and human 
- which are employed to transform inputs into outputs. Their costs include wages, 
interest and depreciation. Linkages channel flows of resources between the facilities, 
and incur transport costs, knowledge transfer costs, etc. 
Resource flows must be coordinated, either by firms or markets, or a 
combination of the two. Coordination applies to both linkages (i.e. inter-plant 
coordination) and facilities (i.e. intra-plant coordination). This generates the two-way 
classification of supply chain costs presented in Table 1. The first dimension 
(corresponding to the columns) concerns whether the costs are incurred by the 
operation of a facility or a linkage. The second dimension (corresponding to the rows) 
concerns whether the costs relate directly to expenditure on resources or to the 
coordination of resource use. 
The interplay of these two dimensions generates four categories of cost. These 
costs vary according to the ownership and location of the facilities involved. Some 
costs depend on whether two facilities have the same owner or the same location, and 
others on whether the owner is based in the same country as the facility. The table 
lists the various components of cost; all have been identified from mainstream IB 
literature (Kotabe and Mol, 2006). For simplicity, no more than three components of 
cost are included in each category. Facilities costs are represented by plant production 
costs, whilst linkage costs are represented by transport costs and technology transfer 
costs. Coordination costs relating to facilities are represented by the cost of foreign 
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production, which is the additional cost incurred in owning and managing a plant or 
warehouse from a foreign location, and the cost of managing foreign R&D, which is 
at least as great as the cost of foreign production; these costs are sometimes referred 
to as the “costs of doing business abroad” due to “liability of foreignness”, and 
include an allowance for the risk of expropriation. Coordination costs relating to 
linkages are particularly important: licensing costs relate to the cost of coordinating a 
flow of knowledge when R and P are owned by different firms; costs of arm’s length 
trade are incurred when P and D are owned by different firms; while foreign 
marketing costs are incurred when D is owned by a foreign firm based in country 1. 
Linkage costs are assumed to be symmetrical – i.e. where reverse flows occur, the 
same costs apply in both directions. 
Because the locations of R and D are fixed by assumption, their facility costs 
are also fixed. Only variable costs influence the choice of strategy, and so fixed costs 
are excluded from the model. Variable costs of production are assumed to be always 
positive, and transport costs and tariffs are non-negative (e.g. there are no subsidies to 
exports). Internalisation of both technology transfer and wholesale trade is beneficial, 
and so the costs of licensing and arm’s length trade are positive. Costs of foreign 
ownership, international technology transfer and foreign marketing are non-negative. 
With a two-country model there are two possible locations of each facility and 
two possible nationalities of ownership. There are three facilities which can be owned 
by either firm, and one facility – production – whose location is variable.  Since each 
ownership decision can in principle be made independently of the others, there are 
2x2x2 = 8 possible ownership strategies. With two location strategies, each of which 
can be supported by any ownership strategy, there are 2x8 = 16 potential supply chain 
strategies altogether. 
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5. Solution of the model 
The model can be solved in five easy steps. However, readers not interested in the 
details may proceed directly to section 6. 
Step 1: Itemise the available strategies and specify their cost functions 
Given that revenues are fixed, the most profitable strategy is the one with the 
lowest costs. The set of possible strategies is mapped out in Table 2. The first column 
identifies the location of production. Each strategy is given a descriptor and a number. 
Costs are shown in the right-hand column. Trade-related costs, t, are incurred 
whenever production is located in country 1 (because the market is in country 2), and 
technology transfer costs related to learning, x, are incurred whenever production is in 
country 2 (because R&D is in country 1). Costs of licensing, n, are incurred whenever 
production and R&D are owned by different firms, and costs of arm’s length trade, k, 
whenever production and distribution are owned by different firms. Costs of foreign 
marketing, m, are incurred whenever distribution is owned by firm 1. Costs of foreign 
ownership, f, are incurred whenever production or distribution is owned by a foreign 
firm, whilst costs g > f  are incurred by foreign ownership of R&D. 
Step 2: Eliminate dominated strategies 
Eight strategies are dominated because their costs are always higher than those 
of some alternative strategy. Dominance arises for two reasons. Firstly, it never pays 
firm 2 to employ firm 1 as a sales agent when firm 2 owns production, and this 
applies wherever production is located. Secondly, it never pays firm 1 to subcontract 
R&D to firm 2 when firm 1 owns production, wherever production is located. The 
eight undominated strategies are listed in Table 3. 
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The undominated strategies are all parsimonious in their use of foreign 
ownership; they use it only where significant economies of internalisation are 
available. Three of them are familiar from conventional IB theory: exporting to a sales 
agent (strategy 2), import substituting FDI in production and sales (strategy 9) and 
licensing (strategy 12). Two further strategies are simple variants of these: strategy 1 
is a variant of strategy 2 in which distribution is controlled through a foreign sales 
subsidiary, whilst strategy 10 is a variant of strategy 9 in which distribution is 
subcontracted to a local firm. 
The remaining three strategies are less familiar, because they all involve 
foreign investment by the firm 2 rather than the firm 1. Strategy 4 (offshore licensing) 
is a variant of conventional licensing (strategy 12) in which the licensee locates 
production country 1rather than country 2. Since the licensee already owns a 
distribution facility, this represents offshore backward integration by the licensee. 
Strategy 8 (fully integrated off-shoring by a host-country MNE) is a variant of 
exporting (strategy 1) in which firm 2 takes over the ownership role of firm 1. Firm 2 
integrates backwards, not only into production but also into R&D; in this respect 
strategy 8 represents an expanded version of offshore licensing (strategy 4). Strategy 
16 (a fully-integrated host-country MNE off-shores R&D) is an analogue of strategy 9 
(import-substituting FDI in production and sales) with firm 2 replacing firm 1; it can 
also be understood as a variant of strategy 8 in which production is in country 2 rather 
than country 1. 
In Dunning and Lundan’s (2008) terminology, the three unfamiliar strategies 
are examples of asset-seeking FDI. They are unfamiliar because asset-seeking appears 
in the present context as a solution to a “market-seeking” problem. The interpretation 
of off-shore licensing (strategy 4) as asset-seeking was explained by CW. Firm 2 
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seeks access to a new technology generated in country 1; it licenses the technology 
from firm 1, produces locally in country 1, and exports to its home country 2. 
Strategies 8 and 16 reflect a similar motivation, although in both cases R&D is 
internalised rather than out-sourced as before; under strategy 8 production remains 
located in country 1, whilst under strategy 16 it is relocated to country 2. 
Step 3: Express the costs of the efficient strategies relative to a suitable baseline cost. 
A suitable baseline is the resource cost of producing in country 2, which is the 
sum of the variable cost of production in country 2 and the cost of technology transfer 
from country 1 to country 2, C0 = c2 +  x .  Using this baseline, it is possible to define 
the net cost of producing in country 1, d, as the gross cost of producing in country 1, 
inclusive of transport costs and tariffs, less the baseline cost, d = c1 – c2 + t - x.  The 
simplified cost functions are shown in the right-hand column of Table 3. The 
functions involve seven components, instead of the nine that appear in Table 2. Since 
the baseline cost, C0, is common to all, however, the cost differentials depend on just 
six components. 
Step 4: Compare costs by constructing cost differentials between each pair of 
strategies 
For a strategy to be selected, it must be no more expensive than any other. 
Thus the cost differential in its favour must be non-negative with respect to each 
alternative strategy. Since each undominated strategy has seven alternatives, a 
strategy is chosen if and only if seven separate cost differentials are non-negative. Not 
all these inequality conditions are necessarily binding, however. The set of pair-wise 
cost differentials derived from Table 3 is shown in Table 4. 
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Step 5: Derive the solution by combining the inequality conditions and then 
simplifying the results 
Two key features of Table 4 are key to the solution. 
 Within the northeast and south-west blocks, the diagonal terms are all 
functions of d and f alone.  
 All the inequalities relating to strategies 1 and 9 involve m, all the inequalities 
relating to strategies 2 and 10 involve k, all the inequalities relating to 
strategies 4 and 12 involve n and all the inequalities relating to strategies 8 and 
16 involve g. 
When these results are combined a simple pattern emerges. The condition for any 
given strategy to be selected is that the value of the repeated parameter associated 
with the strategy is less than some minimum value that depends upon the other 
parameters. The outcome is shown in Table 5, which identifies three scenarios, each 
shown in a separate column. 
 In the first column the net cost advantage of location 2 is very low, d < - f ,  
and the least-cost strategy always involves producing in country 1. Only four 
strategies are in contention – 1, 2, 4, 8 – and the conditions that each must 
satisfy for selection are set out in the first four rows of the column. 
 In the second column the net cost advantage of location 2 may be positive or 
negative, but is small, –f < d < f  . Once again only four strategies are in 
contention – this time 1, 2, 12, 16 – and the conditions that each must satisfy 
for selection are set out in the top two rows and bottom two rows of the 
column. 
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 In the third column the net cost advantage of location 2 is high, d > f , and the 
least-cost strategy always involves producing in country 2. Strategies 9, 10, 12 
and 16 are in contention and the conditions that each must satisfy for selection 
are set out in the bottom four rows of the column. The results may be 
simplified further using the indicator variables z1, z2, z3, which are functions of 
all seven parameters. The simplified results are summarised in Table 6. 
6. Summary of the solution and discussion of its implications 
The solution shows that the ownership and location of production within an 
international supply chain are governed by four key trade-offs. 
 Alternative forms of internalisation. Whatever the location strategy, high costs 
of licensing, n, combined with high costs of arm’s length trade, k, encourage 
full integration, either by a firm based in country 1 or a firm based in country 
2. High n combined with low k encourages the internalisation of production 
and R&D and the externalisation of the production – distribution link, while 
low n and high k has the opposite effect. With low n and low k internalisation 
has little influence on overall strategy.  
 Alternative location strategies. This trade-off concerns the net cost 
differential, d, and the cost of foreign ownership of production, f. A firm 
headquartered in a high-cost country must trade off the saving from relocating 
production to a low-cost country against the penalty of being a foreign owner 
there. 
 Trading off internalisation savings against the cost of foreign operations. This 
is the classic trade-off that exists when two linked facilities – production and 
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R&D, or production and distribution – are located in different countries to 
minimise location costs. The benefits of internalisation, n or k, can only be 
achieved only at the expense of foreign ownership of one of the facilities, 
costing f or g.  
 Alternative firms organising integration. The final trade-off is between 
internalisation effected by firm 1 (based in the county where R&D is located) 
and internalisation effected by firm 2 (based in the country where the market 
is located). In an international supply chain there is a trade-off between the 
cost of foreign ownership of R&D, g, incurred by firm 2, and the cost of 
foreign marketing, m, incurred by firm 1; in the context of the model, a high 
level of g discourages firm 2 from undertaking backward integration into 
R&D whilst a high value of m discourages firm 1 from integrating forward 
into marketing. Thus when full integration is required, the relation between g 
and m governs the relative advantages of firm 1 and firm 2 in organising full 
integration. 
Whilst the first three trade-offs are recognised, in general terms, in the IB 
literature, the fourth is not. Furthermore, these trade-offs are usually considered 
separately in the IB literature whereas the systems view shows that they are all 
related. 
The solution above does not merely specify the boundaries of a given firm, as in 
conventional theory, but the ownership and location of all the firms involved in the 
supply chain. The model ensures that all these boundaries are consistent with each 
other, and that together they maximise the profit generated by the firms as a whole. 
The model also reveals the internal structure of each firm. This internal structure is 
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adapted to the internal structures of the others. Thus solving for the supply chain 
structure as a whole ensures that the configurations of the different firms are 
compatible with each other. In particular, it ensures that they trade with each other in 
a well-defined set of external markets; in other words, it ensures that the 
internalisation decisions of different firms are compatible with each other. 
Within this model there are just two possible boundary locations at which firms 
interface with each other: the market for technology linking R and P, and the market 
for output linking P and D.  In principle both boundaries could exist simultaneously, 
but in practice they will not because the relevant configurations (represented by 
strategies 3, 6, 11 and 14) are never efficient. According to Table 7 four out of the 
eight efficient strategies involve two firms interfacing with each other at a single 
boundary, and the remaining four involve control by a single dominant firm. The 
model also determines whether one or both of the firms is an MNE. In two of these 
cases both the firms are single-country firms, and no MNE is involved, whilst in the 
other two cases an MNE partners with a purely national firm.  If only one firm is 
involved, as in the other four cases, then, given the assumptions of the model, this 
firm is always an MNE.  
Taken together, these results have important implications for: 
 The number of firms involved in a supply chain; 
 The internal structures of firms involved in the supply chain; 
 The location of the external markets where the boundaries of the firms are 
positioned; 
 The efficiency of outsourcing and offshoring strategies and the conditions that 
favour their use; 
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 The relationship between FDI and multinationality, which, in a supply chain 
context, is not so straightforward as often assumed; 
 The appropriation of monopoly profit within a supply chain – an issue that 
raises interesting questions about how the concept of “strategy” should be 
construed in IB. 
These issues are examined in the remainder of this paper.  
7. Out-sourcing and off-shoring 
Off-shoring involves procuring an input from, or supplying an output to, a foreign 
country. Out-sourcing involves the procurement of an input from, or the supply of an 
output to, an independently owned facility (di Gregorio, Musteena and Thomas, 2009; 
Mol, 2007). With just two firms in the model, each based in a different country, out-
sourcing is always international, i.e. involves partnering with a foreign-owned firm. 
The out-sourcing of R&D occurs when production and R&D are owned by 
different firms, while the out-sourcing of distribution occurs when production and 
distribution are owned by different firms. The out-sourcing of R&D occurs whenever 
production is owned by firm 2, whilst the out-sourcing of distribution occurs 
whenever production is owned by firm 1. Thus R&D and distribution cannot be out-
sourced at the same time; this is a consequence of using a two-country model with 
R&D and distribution located in different countries.  
Patterns of out-sourcing are indicated in the first two columns of Table 8, 
where D denotes domestic out-sourcing and F foreign out-sourcing. Altogether eight 
of the sixteen strategies involve R&D out-sourcing, but six of the eight are dominated 
by others (see the bottom lines of the table). The two undominated strategies are 
offshore licensing (strategy 4) and licensing (strategy 12). Both involve production by 
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firm 2; in the first case technology transfer is domestic and in the second 
international. 
Out-sourcing of distribution follows a similar pattern, with six of the eight 
dominated strategies involved, compared with just two of the undominated ones. Both 
undominated strategies involve classic foreign market entry by firm 1: exporting to a 
sales agent (strategy 2) and FDI with a sales agent (strategy 10).  
Off-shoring is a stronger option than out-sourcing. The final two columns of 
Table 8 show that four of the eight undominated strategies involve off-shoring 
production or R&D, rather than just two as before. Off-shoring of R&D is effected by 
offshore licensing (strategy 4), licensing (strategy 12) and full integration by firm 2 
(strategies 8 and 16). Two of these strategies (12 and 16) involve the transfer of 
knowledge from country 1 to country 2, whilst the other two leave knowledge in 
country 1. 
 
Off-shoring of distribution is effected by exporting (strategies 1 and 2) and 
strategies 9 and 10 (import-substituting FDI). These are classic IB market-seeking 
strategies in which production is owned by country 1. There are also four dominated 
strategies that off-shore distribution. 
The relationship between out-sourcing and off-shoring is summarised in Table 
9. It focuses on the undominated strategies. It shows that R&D can be off-shored and 
out-sourced at the same time, and that the same is true of distribution. However, R&D 
is never off-shored when distribution is out-sourced, and distribution is never off-
shored when R&D is outsourced. Conversely, R&D is never out-sourced when 
distribution is off-shored, and distribution is never out-sourced when R&D is off-
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shored. Either distribution or R&D is always off-shored, but in four of the eight cases 
there is no out-sourcing of either activity. 
In general, these results reflect the basic economic logic of out-sourcing and 
off-shoring. Out-sourcing foregoes the benefits of internalisation, whereas off-shoring 
does not. Off-shoring is a logical response to cost differentials between locations and 
it is efficient to exploit such differentials whether internalisation is used or not. Some 
of the specific results, however, also reflect the strict assumptions made about the 
number of different activities (only three) and the number of countries (only two). 
8. Inward and outward FDI 
FDI occurs when a facility is owned by a foreign-headquartered firm, and 
multinationality when a firm owns facilities in more than one country. Care is needed 
when discussing FDI because the “host” country that receives the investment is not 
necessarily the country whose market is served (country 2). Furthermore, the 
relationship between FDI and multinationality is not so simple as often supposed. A 
firm that undertakes FDI is not necessarily multinational because it may invest in a 
single foreign country and operate no domestic facility - in other words, it may be a 
“free-standing firm” (Wilkins, 1988). Free-standing firms appear naturally in supply 
chain models because there is no restriction that a firm must own a facility in the 
country in which it is headquartered. 
In the model above six of the sixteen strategies involve free-standing firms. 
Strategies 3 and 14 involve free-standing FDI in production, strategy 5 free-standing 
FDI in R&D, and strategy 7 free-standing FDI in distribution. Strategies 7 and 13 are 
particularly notable, because the entire supply chain is coordinated by free-standing 
firms – one based in each country. In each case one of the firms owns an integrated 
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operation in the foreign country; under strategy 7 firm 2 integrates R&D and 
production in country 1, while under strategy 13 firm 1 integrates production and 
distribution in country 2. Because all these strategies are dominated, however, free-
standing firms do not appear in the solution; the model therefore predicts correctly 
that free-standing firms – though logically possible – do not normally occur. Free-
standing firms normally appear only when coordination costs vary according to the 
country in which the firm is headquartered – a feature of the investments identified in 
Wilkins’s research. The model can, however, be readily extended to examine this 
case. 
The patterns of FDI associated with undominated activities are analysed in 
Table 10. The first two columns indicate which activity is foreign-owned, and the 
home country in which the investor is headquartered. Six of the eight strategies 
involve some form of FDI. Each firm undertakes FDI on three occasions: thus there is 
no bias in the model towards firm 1 undertaking the FDI. This is in marked contrast to 
popular expositions of FDI theory, which suggest that it is the norm for firm 1 to 
undertake FDI. In the light of the previous discussion, it could be said that “asset-
seeking” FDI is, in principle, just as efficient as “market-seeking” FDI in serving a 
foreign market. There are two strategies which involve no FDI: exporting to a sales 
subsidiary (strategy 2) and licensing (strategy 12); in these cases supply chain 
coordination is undertaken entirely by domestic firms. 
The two firms never undertake FDI at the same time, so there are no cross-
flows of investment. The last two columns show that FDI is always undertaken by an 
MNE. With only three activities to coordinate, both firms cannot be MNEs at the 
same time. In some cases the MNE owns the entire chain and in other cases only a 
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part of it. Where an MNE partly owns a supply chain, it integrates either upstream – R 
and P – or downstream – P and D – but never just the beginning, R, and the end, D.  
This contrasts markedly with the dominated strategies, where all involve FDI. 
Furthermore, six of the eight strategies involve both firms undertaking FDI. A 
hallmark of the dominated strategies, therefore, is that levels of FDI are excessive. 
FDI is excessive because the benefits of internalisation are purchased at too great a 
cost of foreign ownership. This observation affords an interesting perspective on the 
view in some of the FDI literature that FDI is often a superior strategy. 
9. The dualistic view of supply chain strategy 
It was noted above that some of the supply chain strategies could be described in 
more than one way. Where two firms participate in the same supply chain, strategy 
can be described from either firm’s point of view. Only with full integration, where 
only one firm is involved, is the description of strategy unambiguous. For example, if 
firm 1 exports to its own distribution subsidiary (strategy 1) then “exporting” is 
obviously the strategy. But if firm 1 exports to an independent sales agent, namely 
firm 2, then firm 2’s strategy is to import from an integrated foreign supplier. The 
arguments in favour of firm 1’s perspective is that firm 1 undertakes the FDI, it is the 
only firm to internalise, and it undertakes the R&D. The argument in favour of firm 
2’s perspective is that it is based in the country 2 and owns a distribution facility 
there, and therefore knows the market best. 
In many cases the ambiguity is more serious. Consider, for example, licensing 
(strategy 12). From firm 1’s point of view, the strategy is to enter a foreign market by 
licensing to firm 2, whilst from firm 2’s point of view it is to out-source and off-shore 
R&D. The argument for firm 1’s point of view is that it owns R&D, while the 
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argument for firm 2’s point of view is that it is the only firm to internalise (it 
integrates production and distribution) and it is based in the market being served. 
Appealing to FDI is indecisive because neither firm undertakes FDI. In favour of firm 
1, it could be argued that as it owns R&D it controls the development of the 
technology and hence determines the technology that is licensed, but in favour of firm 
2 in could be said that it knows the market best and can therefore specify the 
technology that must be developed; it therefore controls the development of the 
technology through the terms of the licensing agreement, in which it pre-purchases 
the specific technology that it requires. 
Table 11 describes each of the sixteen strategies from the standpoint of each 
firm. Apart from full integration (strategies 1, 8, 9 and 16), all strategies can be 
viewed from two perspectives. Furthermore, for every strategy in which one firm 
appears to take a leading role, there is another strategy in which the roles are 
effectively interchanged and the other firm appears to take the more pro-active role. 
These symmetries involving strategies are characteristic of supply chain analysis, and 
tend to be overlooked by a firm-centred view. 
No consistent view of strategy formation can be found in the IB literature. 
Innovation theorists tend to argue that strategy formation is linked to ownership of 
R&D; marketing theorists that proximity to the customer is key, thereby placing 
strategy formation at opposite end of the supply chain (Buckley and Casson, 2011); 
while Dunning’s eclectic theory suggests that strategy formation is linked to FDI, and 
that licensing is a less strategic option. Supply chain analysis takes no particular view 
on these issues. By assuming that the overall profit of the chain is maximised, it 
leaves open the question of how profit is divided. While all the monopoly profit may 
well be appropriated by the firm that formulates the strategy, no assumption is made 
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about which firm that will be. While it predicts the total profit generated by the chain, 
the theory does not predict how the profit will be divided, either between participating 
firms or particular stages of the chain. The distribution of profit will reflect the terms 
of the contracts negotiated between participating firms, which are not predicted by the 
model. 
10. Applications and extensions 
The systems view of IB has a long intellectual pedigree that can be traced back to the 
inter-war period. Several of the supply chain trade-offs identified above have been 
recognised in empirical applications of IB theory for many years. Foreman-Peck 
(1986), for example, analysed the supply chain for automobile engines in terms of 
internalisation and location, while Read (1986) analysed the interplay between 
differential production location costs and the cost of foreign ownership in the 
synthetic fibres industry. Development economists have also examined these trade-
offs, with special reference to technology transfer to low-wage countries (Helleiner, 
1981). Their relevance to the optimisation of development strategy is discussed in 
UNCTAD (2011), where a large amount of recent supply chain literature is reviewed. 
The trade-off between internalising supply chain linkages through a firm 
headquartered in the host market (firm 2) rather in the country where R&D is based 
(firm 1) helps to explain the growing importance of asset-seeking investments in high-
technology industries. In particular, the falling cost of foreign ownership of R&D 
means that it is now much more viable than before for firms headquartered in major 
markets where indigenous technological capability is still developing to acquire R&D 
facilities in technologically advanced economies (e.g. Chinese investment in the US 
and Indian investment in the UK). As Buckley and Casson (2011) suggest, this may 
explain why technology is becoming “commodified”, and firm advantages are 
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increasingly seen to lie with marketing-led firms headquartered in certain types of 
emerging market – namely developing countries with large populations.  The relative 
decline of the traditional model of market-seeking FDI and the rise of asset-seeking 
FDI are therefore “two sides of the same coin”, as are the decline of traditional 
headquarters countries and rise of new headquarters countries amongst the emerging 
market economies.  
The model presented above helps to bridge the gap between firm-specific case 
studies (e.g. Ivarsson and Alvstam, 2010) and the general equilibrium models 
favoured by trade theorists (Grossman and Helpman, 2005; Grossman and Rossi-
Hansberg, 2008).  As a model of supply chain equilibrium within an industry, it links 
both with intra-industry analysis of supply chain coordination and inter-industry 
analysis of trade.  
The model can be extended in various ways. For example, it could be used to 
formalise some of the insights in Mudambi’s (2008) analysis of fine-slicing and the 
distribution of value added within the supply chain; although Mudambi presents profit 
functions for alternative supply chain configurations, he does not solve his model 
explicitly. The model could also be used to analyse the impact of headquarters 
location on supply chain efficiency; this would involve introducing location-specific 
costs of headquarters operation, making it possible to address the topical issue of 
stand-alone headquarters. Such a model could explain why free-standing firms, 
“hollow firms” and “network firms” emerge in certain industries at certain times (see 
Contractor, Kumar, Kundu and Pedersen, 2010).  
There is an important qualification, however. The model presented above is 
the most sophisticated model of its type that possesses a straightforward closed-form 
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analytical solution that can be explained in intuitive terms. Although more complex 
models can be devised, their solutions are extremely complicated. Every time a new 
dimension of variation is introduced into the model, the number of possible strategies 
doubles, from sixteen to thirty-two to sixty-four, and so on.  
It is, however, possible to alter the specification of the model without 
increasing its dimensions.  Instead of footloose production, for example, footloose 
R&D can be introduced. Introducing an additional stage of production makes it 
possible to analyse more complex ownership issues, provided that all locations are 
fixed. Alternatively, by fixing some of the ownership arrangements the model can be 
generalised to three locations in order to analyse Triad effects, and linkages between 
countries at different stages of development. While the basic principles of the model 
will remain unchanged, altering the context will change the predictions. 
Another possibility is to increase the number of dimensions but to introduce 
additional constraints at the same time. It is possible to assume a multi-level division 
of labour in which different types of activity, such as production, distribution and 
R&D, are resolved into sub-systems of inter-dependent constituent activities. If each 
constituent activity interacts only with other activities of the same type then the model 
can be solved in two stages. Each sub-system is optimised conditional on the 
configuration of the system as a whole, and the system as a whole is then optimised 
on the basis that each sub-system will adapt to the overall configuration.  
Another approach is to use a different method of solution. If a hierarchy of 
sub-systems cannot be assumed, for example, then the model can be solved through 
numerical simulation instead. This establishes a useful agenda for future research. 
11. Conclusions 
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This paper has presented a model of supply chain coordination in which four strategic 
decisions are involved: the ownership of three activities -  R&D, production and 
distribution - and the location of one of them - production. The interdependencies 
between the ownership decisions, and between ownership and location decisions, 
have all been examined. It is shown that where the benefits of internalisation are 
positive, only half of the possible supply chain strategies are viable. 
Efficiency is analysed from the perspective of the supply chain as a whole 
rather than any individual firm. Indeed, it is impossible to determine whether any firm 
of a given type (i.e. comprising a given structure of activities) will actually exist until 
the overall structure of the chain is determined. When a systems view is adopted, 
firms become endogenous institutions that emerge in specific configurations under 
specific circumstances. Unlike the firm-centred view, the existence of any specific 
type of firm cannot be taken as a given. 
The circumstances that govern the emergence of firms are captured by the 
basic parameters of the model. There are four sets of parameters, which between them 
govern the resource costs and communication costs of the system, and include the 
costs of both the activities and their linkages. These parameters represent the 
economic fundamentals of the relevant industry. Ownership structures depend mainly 
on coordination costs and location strategies mainly on resource costs. There are 
interdependencies, however, which arise because of the costs of foreign ownership; 
the lower these costs, the more separable the ownership and location decisions 
become. 
Where partnerships develop, the terms of the partnership will reflect the 
negotiating strategies of the firms, and the outcome of these negotiations will 
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determine the distribution of profit between the firms. A firm with a monopoly of a 
technology has the greatest bargaining power, but this is not necessarily the firm that 
carries out the R&D; where technologies are easy to specify and there are competing 
R&D facilities, a firm that is close to the market and alert to opportunities (i.e. firm 2) 
may acquire a technology at cost and thereby appropriate the rents.  
The systems view is not intended to replace the firm-centred view, but rather 
to complement it. The firm-centred view has intuitive appeal for business students and 
managers because it focuses on issues of immediate concern to them. It fits well with 
the notion that IB theory exists to advise managers about devising and implementing 
internationalisation strategies.  The firm–centred view, however, affords only a partial 
and localised view of the firm’s environment that is predicated on given market 
opportunities, given cost conditions, and given competitive rivalries.  
The systems view, by contrast, analyses long-run global issues rather than 
short-run local issues. It takes very little as given. In the long run certain types of firm 
may no longer be viable, because of changes in the global system, and for such firms 
the only question may be to optimise their exit strategy. The threat that these firms 
face may come, not from their existing competitors, but from future competitors, 
including firms that have not yet been founded. Unlike the firm-centred view, the 
systems view can identify opportunities for new types of firm. The key strategic 
decisions relating to these firms will be taken by start-up entrepreneurs before their 
firms have even been founded, but the legacy of these decisions may live on within 
the corporate cultures of the successful start-up firms. 
Where existing firms survive, they may find that in future their roles are 
radically changed – e.g. they may become subcontractors to firms to which they 
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previously subcontracted. While they may wish that they could continue to hold the 
initiative, competitive conditions may dictate otherwise, and the only alternative to 
accepting a subordinate role may be to fail altogether. The systems view can help 
such firms to understand the economic logic of their altered circumstances, and to 
make the necessary adjustments before it is too late. Using the systems view, it is 
possible to analyse, not only responses to given changes in the environment, but to 
analyse the fundamental drivers of change itself.  
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Table 1. Classification of costs in the model 
 
 Type of Activity 
Plant Linkage 
Type of 
Cost 
Resource Cost of local 
production in countries 
1 and 2, c1, c2 > 0 
Trade costs: Transport, 
tariff and compliance costs 
incurred by exports or 
imports (symmetrical by 
country), t > 0 
Technology transfer cost 
from country 1 to country 
2, x > 0 
Coordination Cost premium of 
foreign ownership of 
production or 
distribution 
(symmetrical by 
country), f > 0 
Cost premium of 
foreign ownership of 
R&D, g > f > 0 
Cost of arm’s length trade: 
the internalisation benefit 
for wholesale market, k > 0 
Cost of licensing: the 
internalisation benefit for 
knowledge transfer 
foregone, n > 0 
Differential marketing cost: 
Cost to a distributor owned 
in country 1 of selling in 
country 2, m > 0 
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Table 2. Ownership decisions for R&D, production and distribution facilities, 
coupled with a location decision for a production facility 
Strategy: 
Number and 
Descriptor 
Location 
of 
Prod’n 
Own’ship 
of R&D  
Own’ship 
of 
Prod’n 
Own’ship 
of Distr’n 
Cost 
1. Export to 
sales subsidiary 
1 1 1 1 C1 = c1 + t + m + f 
2. Export to 
sales agent 
1 1 1 2 C2 = c1 + t + k 
3. FDI in 
distribution 
with 
subcontracting 
to foreign-
owned local 
plant 
1 1 2 1 C3 = c1 + t + k + n + m + 
2f 
4. Offshore 
licensing 
1 1 2 2 C4 = c1 + t + n       + f 
5. Export to 
sales subsidiary 
with 
subcontracting 
to local foreign-
owned R&D 
facility 
1 2 1 1 C5 = c1 + t + n + m + f + 
g 
6. Host-country 
MNE 
subcontracts 
off-shore 
production 
1 2 1 2 C6 = c1 + t + k + n + g 
7. FDI in 
distribution 
with out-
sourced 
production and 
R&D  
1 2 2 1 C7 = c1 + t + k + m + 2f 
+ g 
8. Fully 
integrated host-
country MNE 
off-shores 
production and 
R&D  
1 2 2 2 C8 = c1 + t + f + g 
9. Import-
substituting FDI 
in production 
and sales 
2 1 1 1 C9 = c2 + x + m + 2f 
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10. Import-
substituting FDI 
in production 
with sales agent 
2 1 1 2 C10 = c2 + x + k + f 
11 FDI in sales 
with 
subcontracted 
production to 
foreign-owned 
local plant 
2 1 2 1 C11 = c2 + x + k + n + m 
+ f 
12. Licensing 2 1 2 2 C12 = c2 + x + n 
13. Host-
country firm 
licenses a 
source-country 
firm 
2 2 1 1 C13 = c2 + x + m + n + 2f 
+ g 
14. Host-
country MNE 
subcontracts 
production in 
host country to 
foreign firm 
2 2 1 2 C14 = c2 + x+ k + n + f + 
g 
15. Host-
country MNE 
subcontracts 
distribution to 
foreign firm 
2 2 2 1 C15 = c2 + x+ k + m + f + 
g 
16. Fully 
integrated host 
country MNE 
off-shores R&D 
2 2 2 2 C16 = c2 + x + g 
 
Note: Cj denotes the cost of strategy j (j = 1,…, 16). c1: cost of production in country 
1; c2: cost of production in country 2; t: trade-related cost; x: technology transfer cost; 
n: licensing cost; k: cost of arm’s length trade; m: cost of foreign marketing; f: cost of 
foreign ownership of production; g: cost of foreign ownership of R&D. 
 
In Tables 1 - 8 ‘host country’ refers to country 2. Note, however, that if firm 2 invests 
in country 1 then country 1 would be the ‘host’ so far as the FDI was concerned. 
Using the systems view, the terms ‘source’ and ‘host’ must be used with care. 
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Table 3. Simplified cost structures of undominated strategies 
 
Strategy Simplified Cost 
1. Export to sales subsidiary C1 = C0 + d        + m       + f 
2. Export to sales agent C2 = C0 + d + k 
4. Offshore licensing C4 = C0 + d              + n + f 
8. Fully-integrated host-
country MNE off-shores 
production and R&D 
C8 = C0 + d                     + f + g 
9. Import-substituting FDI 
in production and sales 
C9 = C0              + m      + 2f 
10. Import-substituting FDI 
in production with sales 
agent 
C10 = C0      + k              + f 
12. Licensing C12 = C0                          + n 
16. Fully-integrated host-
country MNE off-shores 
R&D 
C16 = C0                                      + g 
 
Note: C0 = c2 + x; d = c1 – c2 + t – x. 
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Table 4. Inequality conditions that identify the least cost strategy from amongst the 
undominated strategies 
 1 2 4 8  9 10 12 16 
1 - k–m-f n-m g-m  -d+f  -d+k-m -d+n–m 
-f 
-d-m-
f+g  
2 -k+m 
+f 
- -k+n+f –k+f +g  -d–k 
+m+2f 
-d+f -d–k+n -d–k+g 
4 m-n k–n-f - g-n  -d+m 
–n+f 
-d+k-n -d-f -d-f+g-n 
8 m-g k –f-g n-g -  -d+m+ 
f-g 
-d+k-g -d+n– f 
-g 
-d-f 
          
9 d-f d+k–m 
–2f 
d–m+n 
-f 
d–m–f 
+g 
 - k–m-f –m+n–
2f 
–m–2f 
+g 
10 d–k+m d-f d–k+n d–k+g  -k+m 
+f 
- -k+n-f -k-f+g 
12 d–n+m 
+f 
d+k-n d+f d–n+f 
+g 
 m–n +2f k–n+f - -n+g 
16 d+m+f -
g 
d+k-g d+f–
g+n 
d+f  m+2f-g k+f-g n -g - 
 
 
Note: Each cell indicates the cost saving afforded by the row strategy relative to the 
column strategy. The expression in each cell must be non-negative if the row strategy 
is to be preferred to the column strategy. By construction, the diagonal terms are zero, 
and the off-diagonal terms are equal in magnitude but opposite in sign when reflected 
in the main diagonal. To solve them, therefore, it is sufficient to use either the cells to 
the north-east of the main diagonal or the cells to the south-west of it. The cells are 
shown in four blocks: the top left-hand block reports differentials between pairs of 
strategies which both involve production in country 1; the bottom right-hand block 
relates to strategies that both involve production in country 2; whilst the off-diagonal 
blocks relate to pairs of strategies that involve production in different countries. 
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Table 5. Solution of the model 
 
Strategy d <  -f -f  < d <  f d  >  f 
1 m < k – f, n, g m + f  < k, n - d, g - d  
2 k – f  < m, n, g k < m + f, n - d, g - d  
4 n < m, k – f, g   
8 g < m, k – f, n   
9   m + 2f  < k + f, n, g 
10   k + f  < m + 2f, n, g 
12  n - d < m + f, k, g - d n < m + 2f, k + f, g 
16  g – d < m + f, k, n - d g < m + 2f, k + f, n 
 
 
Note: In the north-east block, the diagonal term in the top row indicates that strategy 1 
is preferred to strategy 9 when d < f, and conversely that 9 is preferred to 1 when d > 
f.  Similarly the diagonal term in the second row indicates that strategy 2 is preferred 
to strategy 10 when d < f, and that strategy 10 is preferred to strategy 2 when d > f.  
The diagonal term in the third row implies that strategy 4 is preferred to strategy 12 
when d < - f, and that strategy 12 is preferred to strategy 4 when d > - f, while the 
diagonal term in the fourth row implies that strategy 8 is preferred to strategy 16 when 
d < - f, and that strategy 16 is preferred to strategy 8 when d > - f. 
Now f > 0,  d > f  implies that d > - f  and d < - f implies that d <  f . Hence when d < - 
f strategy 1 is preferred to strategy 9, 2 to 10, 4 to 12 and 8 to 16; thus only strategies 
1, 2, 4 and 8 are viable.  Conversely, when d > f  9 is preferred to 1, 10 to 2, 12 to 4 
and 16 to 8, so that only strategies 9,10, 12 and 16 are viable. Finally, if –f < d < f 
then strategy 1 is preferred to 9, 2 to 10, 12 to 4 and 16 to 8; thus only strategies 1, 2, 
12 and 16 are viable. Thus when d < - f it is sufficient to compare strategies 1,2,4 and 
8 in order to determine which is best; when d > f  it is sufficient to compare strategies 
9,10, 12 and 16, whilst when –f < d < f  it is sufficient to compare strategies 1,2, 12 
and 16. 
In the top half of the table all the terms in row 1 (other than the north-east diagonal 
term referred to above) involve the parameter m, all the analogous terms in row 2 
involve k, all the analogous terms in row 3 involve n and all the analogous terms in 
row 4 involve g; and the same pattern is repeated in the bottom half of the table. 
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Table 6. Simplified solution of the model 
 
Strategy d <  -f -f  < d <  f d  >  f 
1 m = z1 m + f = z3  
2 k – f  = z1 k = z3  
4 n = z1   
8 g = z1   
9   m + 2f = z2 
10   k + f= z2 
12  n - d = z3 n = z2 
16  g – d = z3 g = z2 
 
 
Note: z1 = min [m, k – f, n, g]; z2 = min [m + 2f, k + f, n, g]; 
z3 = min [m + f, k, n - d, g - d]  
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Table 7. The endogeneity of firms: the number of firms and the scope of their 
operations under alternative supply chain strategies 
 
Strategy Scope of Firm’s Operations 
Firm 1 Firm 2 
1. Export to sales subsidiary Fully integrated MNE 
exports to a wholly-
owned distribution 
facility 
 
2. Export to sales agent Single-country firm 
exports to an 
independent foreign 
distributor 
Single-country foreign 
distributor imports from 
country 1 
4. Offshore licensing Single-country firm 
licenses a foreign firm 
MNE acquires foreign 
technology under license 
and exports to a wholly-
owned foreign distribution 
facility  
8. Fully-integrated host-
country MNE off-shores 
production and R&D 
 Fully integrated MNE 
undertakes both production 
and R&D overseas 
9. Import-substituting FDI in 
production and sales 
Fully integrated MNE 
produces and sells 
abroad 
 
10. Import-substituting FDI 
in production with sales 
agent 
MNE produces abroad 
and distributes through 
an independent foreign 
firm 
Single-country firm 
distributes product 
acquired from local 
foreign-owned plant  
12. Licensing Single-country firm 
licenses a foreign firm 
Single-country firm 
licenses a technology used 
in local production and 
distribution  
16. Fully-integrated host-
country MNE off-shores 
R&D 
 Fully integrated MNE 
undertakes R&D abroad 
and produces and sells 
locally 
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Table 8. Analysis of out-sourcing and off-shoring strategies 
 
Strategy Out-source 
 
Off-shore 
 R&D Distribution R&D Distibution 
1. Export to sales subsidiary    F 
2. Export to sales agent  F  F 
4. Offshore licensing D  D  
8. Fully-integrated host-
country MNE off-shores 
production and R&D 
  D  
9. Import-substituting FDI in 
production and sales 
   D 
10. Import-substituting FDI 
in production with sales 
agent 
 D  D 
12. Licensing F  F  
16. Fully-integrated host-
country MNE off-shores 
R&D 
  F  
Total of dominating 
strategies 
2 2 4 4 
Total of dominated strategies 6 6 4 4 
Total 8 8 8 8 
 
 
Note: D: Domestic linkage; F international linkage (involving export or import) 
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Table 9. Relationship between out-sourcing and off-shoring for undominated 
strategies 
 
 Off-shoring 
Out-sourcing R&D Distribution None 
R&D 4, 12   
Distribution  2, 10  
None 8, 16 1, 9  
 
 
Note: The numbers that appear in the cells identify the strategies that fit the cross-
classification. 
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Table 10. Analysis of FDI stocks and MNE operations 
 
 
Strategy 
FDI MNE 
Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 1 Firm 2 
1. Export to sales subsidiary D  R P D  
2. Export to sales agent     
4. Offshore licensing  P  P D 
8. Fully-integrated host-country MNE off-
shores production and R&D 
 R P  R P D 
9. Import-substituting FDI in production 
and sales 
P D  R P D  
10. Import-substituting FDI in production 
with sales agent 
P  R P  
12. Licensing     
16. Fully-integrated host-country MNE 
off-shores R&D 
 R  R P D 
Total of dominating strategies 3 3 3 3 
Total of dominated strategies 7 7 3 3 
Total 10 10 6 6 
 
Note: In columns 1 and 2 D, P R denote FDI in distribution, production and R&D 
respectively. Blank cells indicate no FDI. In columns 3 and 4 D, P, R denote the 
activities owned and controlled by an MNE. Blank cells denote no MNE. 
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Table 11. Perceptions of supply chain strategy by different participating firms 
 
Strategy as Perceived by 
Firm 1 
Strategy as Perceived by 
Firm 2 
Symmetric Strategy 
with Similar Location 
of Production and 
Interchanged 
Ownership of Facilities 
1. Export to sales subsidiary NA 16 
2. Export to sales agent Import from integrated 
foreign producer 
15 
3. FDI in distribution with 
subcontracting to foreign-
owned local plant 
Free-standing FDI in 
production (with out-sourced 
R&D and distribution) 
14 
4. Offshore licensing FDI with out-sourced off-
shore R&D 
13 
5. Export to sales subsidiary 
with subcontracting to local 
foreign-owned R&D facility 
Free-standing FDI in R&D 
with licensing to foreign 
exporter 
12 
6. Export with out-sourced 
R&D and distribution 
FDI in R&D with licensing to 
foreign exporter 
11 
7. Subcontracting production 
and R&D to an integrated 
foreign firm 
Free-standing FDI with 
integrated foreign production 
and R&D 
10 
8. NA Fully integrated FDI in R&D 
and production 
9 
9. Fully integrated import-
substituting FDI in 
production and sales 
NA 8 
10. Import-substituting FDI 
in production with sales 
agent 
Procure from an integrated 
inward investor 
7 
11 FDI in sales with 
subcontracted production to 
foreign-owned local plant 
Domestic production with 
outsourced R&D and 
distribution 
6 
12. Licensing Domestic production and 
distribution with out-sourced 
R&D 
5 
13. Free-standing FDI with 
out-sourced R&D 
Free-standing FDI in R&D 
with licensing to exporter 
4 
14.Free-standing FDI with 
out-sourced R&D and 
distribution  
Free-standing FDI in R&D 
with subcontracted 
production foreign-owned 
local plant 
3 
15. Host-country MNE 
subcontracts distribution to 
foreign firm 
Free-standing FDI with out-
sourced distribution 
2 
16. NA FDI in R&D 1 
 
